Attestation has become a promising approach for ensur ing software integrity in wireless sensor networks. How ever, current attestation either focuses on static system properties, e.g., code integrity, or requires hardware sup port such as Tr usted Platform Module (TPM). However, there are attacks exploiting vulnerabilities that do not vio late static system properties, and sensor platforms may not have hardware-based security support. This paper presents a software attestation scheme for dynamic data integrity based on data boundary integrity. It automatically trans forms the source code and inserts data guards to track run time program data. A data guard is unrecoverable once it is corrupted by an attacker, even if the attacker fully con trols the system later. The corruption of any data guard at runtime can be remotely detected. A corruption either indi cates a software attack or a bug in the software that needs immediate attention. The benefits of the proposed attesta tion scheme are as follows. First, it does not rely on any additional hardware support, making it suitable for low cost sensor nodes. Second, it introduces minimal communi cation cost and has adjustable runtime memory overhead. Third, it works even if sensor nodes use diff erent hardware platforms, as long as they run the same software. The pro totype implementation and the experiments on Te losB motes show that the proposed technique is both effective and effi cient for sensor networks.
port such as Tr usted Platform Module (TPM). However, there are attacks exploiting vulnerabilities that do not vio late static system properties, and sensor platforms may not have hardware-based security support. This paper presents a software attestation scheme for dynamic data integrity based on data boundary integrity. It automatically trans forms the source code and inserts data guards to track run time program data. A data guard is unrecoverable once it is corrupted by an attacker, even if the attacker fully con trols the system later. The corruption of any data guard at runtime can be remotely detected. A corruption either indi cates a software attack or a bug in the software that needs immediate attention. The benefits of the proposed attesta tion scheme are as follows. First, it does not rely on any additional hardware support, making it suitable for low cost sensor nodes. Second, it introduces minimal communi cation cost and has adjustable runtime memory overhead. Third, it works even if sensor nodes use diff erent hardware platforms, as long as they run the same software. The pro totype implementation and the experiments on Te losB motes show that the proposed technique is both effective and effi cient for sensor networks.
Introduction
Wireless sensor nodes often lack advanced hardware support for system integrity and are vulnerable to attacks exploiting software flaws. Additionally, it is often costly to physically access sensor nodes and check their system integrity after deployment. As a result, attestation, i.e., re motely verifying the integrity of sensor software, becomes particularly attractive.
Software attestation is a challenge-response protocol.
The verifier (e.g., base station) sends an attestation com-978-1-4244-7501-8/10/$26.00 ©201O IEEE mand to the attester (the node being attested) asking for certain state information as the evidence of its software in tegrity. Such state can be computed correctly only if the attester's system meets certain integrity requirement, e.g., having an authentic copy of the software. After receiving the response, the verifier compares it with the known good state to check if the software at the attester has been cor rupted. If a sensor node fails to give the correct answer, actions can be taken to revoke this node from the network.
Existing techniques and their limitations:
Several software attestation schemes have been proposed to attest the static memory regions of the software [19, 25, 21, 18] .
A static memory region is the place where the content never changes during software execution. One example is the code segment of a program that does not include self-modifying code. SWATT [19] and Pioneer [18] are software-based solutions where the challenger asks for the hash of randomly traversed code blocks. To compute a cor rect hash value, the challenged device has to have an au thentic copy of the code, which turns out to be difficult for a malicious device with the same hardware. Similar ideas were studied in [25, 21] . However, these solutions only at test the static part, e.g., code and static program configura tions, of the challenged system. Dynamic data, which also play a critical role in software integrity, are ignored. In ad dition, these solutions only measure the software integrity at the time of attestation; there is a large TOUTOA (time-of use and time-of-attestation) gap. BIND [22] narrows such gap. However, it uses hardware support (TPM) and assumes a secure kernel that can ensure the security of code execu tion. Unfortunately, we cannot promise that every sensor node will be equipped with a TPM chip.
Recent studies have also shown that an adversary can launch attacks without modifying the code. These attacks defeat all existing static attestation techniques. One exam ple is the "return-into-libc" attack [15] , where the adversary takes advantage of existing function calls to run malicious code. More recently, researchers have shown that it is even possible to run malicious code without modifying the code or using existing function calls [20, 7] . This attack takes advantage of many gadgets in the program, each consist ing of a sequence of instructions that end with a "ret" and achieve something useful to the attacker. The attack has been demonstrated on Atmel AV R-based sensors.
ReDAS [13] was recently proposed to measure the in tegrity of dynamic system properties. This method attests the structural constraints of memory objects and data in variants. One example is "the saved frame pointers in stack must form a chain". Given this property, one can monitor program execution and record integrity violation evidence for attestation. However, this method has a number of prob lems. First, it needs a training phase to run a program with a large number of test data and use the Daikon [5] tool to collect data invariants. Identifying these constraints and in variants is both time-consuming and error-prone. Second, this method uses TPM, which is often not available at sen sor nodes. Third, it measures the system integrity at each system call point, which may lead to a large TOUTOA gap.
Finally, ReDAS does not consider non-control-data attacks,
i.e., the attacks that do not modify control data such as func tion pointers and return addresses [23] .
Our contributions: We model a program as a sequence of statements that manipulate a set of data; its control flow and data flow are determined by program logic. At source code level, each operation on a data object usually intends to limit its effect within this data object. In other words, the semantics of the operation on one object should not generate side effects to change the state of any other data object that is not involved in the operation. For example, for statement strcpy (buf , user_input) ; , the high level intended semantics is to only copy the string specified by the second argument user_input to the first object buf, not to any where else in the memory. As a result, any object that is physically adjacent to buf in memory should not be mod ified by this statement. However, the problem is that such high-level intended semantics is not enforced during pro gram execution, and the string user_input is just blindly copied to buf without any boundary check. Hence, buffer overflow occurs when the second argument user_input is a string that is larger than the buffer size.
In this paper, we introduce data boundary integrity, [12] . The result shows that our scheme is effective and efficient in practice.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes system assumptions and attack models. Section 3 presents our attestation scheme in detail. Section 4 discusses implementation issues. Section 5 presents the evaluation results. Section 6 reviews other related work. Section 7 discusses some limitations of our scheme. Section 8 concludes this paper.
2 Threats, Attack Models, and Assumptions
Remotely exploiting the software vulnerability at sen sor nodes is often more attractive than physically access ing them to launch an attack. First, physically accessing a sensor node not only incurs high cost for attackers but also physically exposes themselves in the field. Second, sensor applications are often written in unsafe languages such as nesC [8] and C. Thus, vulnerabilities such as buffer over flow are likely to appear in sensor software as well. In fact, a number of studies have pointed out that buffer overflow can be launched to compromise sensor nodes [9, 7] . Third, the homogeneous software infrastructure in sensor networks allows attackers to infect a large fraction of sen sor nodes using the same software attack. It has been shown that worms in sensor networks are possible and can propa gate and compromise the whole network quickly [9, 26] .
In this paper, we focus on adversaries that remotely ex ploit the sensor software. First, the adversary may remotely exploit the software vulnerability to directly inject and run malicious code. In order to achieve this, he may (1) di rectly inject malicious code using buffer overflow attacks, (2) launch "return-into-libc" attacks using existing function calls [15] , or (3) inject "meta-gadgets" [7] . Second, in addi tion to directly injecting malicious code, the adversary may simply manipulate some security-critical data (e.g., cryp tographic keys) in the original program to compromise its security. For example, if the key used to verify software updates is overwritten by the adversary, he will be able to directly reprogram the sensor node with malicious software.
In addition to the above capabilities, we also assume that the adversary can attack any network link. In other words, he can interrupt, eavesdrop, modify, forge, and replay any net work traffic. The attacker can also launch DoS attacks (e.g., jamming) to disable the network for a short period of time.
We assume that there is an authenticated communication channel between the verifier and an attester. This can be achieved by establishing a pairwise key between them us ing existing techniques [6, 2, 14] . We assume that the ini tialization of a sensor node is secure. We also assume that the verifier is trustworthy. We assume that the attestation module has been installed on each sensor node, and the ap plications in every sensor node have been instrumented with our attestation scheme discussed in Section 3 (our tool can automatically instrument the program).
The Proposed Attestation Scheme
In this section, we will describe our data boundary in tegrity model and show how to set up, measure, and manage the data guards in the program to achieve the desired secu rity requirements. In the end, we will present our attestation scheme to stop attacks exploiting program data.
Data Boundary Integrity Model
Consider a program P that runs on a sensor node C. In tuitively, program P consists of a set of statements 8= {81, 82, ... , 8m} written in a language L that manipulate a set of data objects D = {D1' D2, ... , Dn}. The intended semantic effect of statement 8i is always confined to the data objects that are involved in this statement. In other words, other data objects in D should not be modified by this statement.
However, such development-time intended semantics is no longer enforced at runtime. To detect the inconsistency between the intended seman tics and the runtime behavior, we introduce an additional set of data objects B = {B1' B2, ... , Bn}, where Bi is placed at the memory that physically surround Di at runtime. If the intended semantics has not been violated at runtime, we know that none of the values in B will be corrupted since these values are semantically independent from all data ob jects in the original program. In other words, a corruption of a value in B indicates a software attack or a software bug that needs immediate attention. Thus, we can capture any attack that overflow a program variable. We found that a wide range of attacks need to overflow at least one program data object. As a result, our model can handle a wide range of software attacks against sensor nodes.
Direct overflow attacks:
Buffer overflow and heap overflow vulnerabilities can be exploited to launch a large number of attacks that alter the program control flow. Ex amples include code injection attacks, return-into-libc at tacks [15] , and return-oriented-programming attacks [20] .
For example, stack buffer overflow can be used to change return addresses, and heap overflow can be used to mod ify function pointers. These data overflows can also be ex ploited to modify security-critical or decision-making vari ables to launch non-control-data attacks [23] . For example, a boolean variable that is used to determine whether authen tication is passed or not can be flipped to circumvent the authentication. In our model, such direct overflow attacks can be immediately captured because of the corruption of the boundary integrity of the overflowed data object.
Indirect overflow attacks:
Integer overflow and double free vulnerabilities are often followed by buffer overflow or heap overflow attacks to compromise the system security [23] . For example, an integer overflow may cause a smaller buffer being allocated, which leads to a buffer overflow at tack at a later stage. As another example, calling freeO twice on the same variable can also lead to a buffer over flow. Our model is capable of detecting the overflow of any program data object. Thus, indirect data overflow caused by other vulnerabilities can be handled by our scheme as well.
From the above discussion, we believe that a wide range of possible attacks against sensor nodes are captured by our data boundary integrity model. To be more specific, any software attack that starts from overflowing a program data object can be captured by our model.
Due to the dynamic nature of runtime data objects, their corresponding data guards are also dynamic. In the follow ing, we present the three main components of our scheme:
(1) data guard setting up, (2) runtime guarding, and (3) data guard memory management.
Data Guard Setting Up
There are two problems that must be carefully consid ered: (1) how to set up the data guard for a data object and 
Runtime Guarding
Since many data objects in D are dynamically created and destroyed at runtime, their data guards are also dy namic. In order to monitor the data boundary integrity, the runtime behavior of these data guards must satisfy follow ing three requirements. These three requirements ensure the security of our scheme. We will explain them one by one and describe how we enforce them.
• Security requirement J: The data guard for a dynamic data object Di must be set up before any write instruc tion on Di is executed. Otherwise, any modification done before the setup cannot be verified.
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• Security requirement 2: A corrupted data guard must not be recoverable even if the attacker fully controls the system after corruption.
• Security requirement 3: The attester must have all un corrupted data guard values to pass the attestation. The attacker cannot compute a valid answer without a com plete set of uncorrupted data guards.
Security Requirement 1
The data guard for data object Di must be set up before any write instruction on Di is executed. Otherwise, the attacker may overflow Di right before its data guard is in place. As a result, we will not be able to notice such overflow. There are three types of data objects: global data, local data, and heap data. Accordingly, there are three types of data guards:
global guards, local guards, and heap guards. guards to these parameter data in stack as in C language, pa rameter passing itself does not generates overflow in stack.
Security Requirement 2
Once an attacker corrupted a data guard in a sensor node C, the original value of the data guard must not be recoverable.
One way to achieve this is to let C request a fresh secret data guard value from the verifier each time it needs to set up a new data guard. Thus, a data guard does not depend on any other information in the attester's system. If it is corrupted, the attacker cannot restore it. However, note that a lot of data guards are created and destroyed dynamically. This simple method will therefore introduce substantial commu nication cost and is thus not feasible. In this paper, we propose a secure data guard value assignment method as shown in Algorithm 1. It satisfies the requirement 2 (also the requirement 3 as we will discuss in next subsection) and also greatly reduces the communication cost.
When an attester node C needs to set up its first data guard, it sends a request to the verifier. The verifier sends back a secret value e and a nonce value nonce. Node C computes a hash value L1 = H(e, nonce, 1), where H is a secure one-way hash function and the integer 1 is a se quence number maintained at the attester node to track how many data guards have been created. After getting the hash result, C will delete e and nonce from memory immedi ately. From now on, it is impossible to restore L1 if it is corrupted since e and nonce is no longer available. At this point, we only have one data guard in the system, and its value c(l) = L1.
When C needs to set its second data guard, it first re trieves the most recently created data guard (i.e., c(l) if not corrupted) in memory. Then it updates the first data guard by computing c(l) = H(L1, 2), sets the value of the sec ond data guard c(2) to H(L1, -2), and erases the value L1 in memory. Here 2 is the sequence number indicating that there are totally two data guards created so far. In general, when node C needs to set its i-th data guard (i > 1), it retrieves the value of the (i -l)-th data guard c( i-I), which equals Li-1 at this point, updates c( i-I) to H (Li-1, i), sets the val ue c( i) of the new data guard to Li = H(Li-1, -i), and erases Li-1 from memory. Figure   1 shows a tree explaining how data guards are computed when 4 data guards are needed in the system. Each leaf or internal node in the tree can be directly computed from its parent node using the one-way hash function. Since the root and all internal nodes are erased from memory, an attacker has no way to recover a corrupted data guard. Therefore, requirement 2 is satisfied.
Please note that we will not delete any data guard created at runtime unless we need to re-initialize all data guards.
A potential problem is that a lot of program data objects are dynamically created and destroyed. This will bring a challenge to the management of the data guards. We will revisit this issue in Section 3.4.
Security Requirement 3
The attacker must be forced to use all data guard values to calculate the integrity evidence during the attestation. Figure 1 , the attacker cannot cheat about how many data guards in the system, assuming the node is com promised, and cannot pass attestation by only using some of them. In this section, we will show how this is achieved using Algorithm 1. We ignore the communication cost for now. We will show later how communication cost can be reduced in our final protocol.
Suppose at moment t, a sensor node has m (m > 1) data guards {c(l), c(2), ... , c(m)}. From Algorithm 1, we have:
Given any number m, the verifier can calculate all good values from c(l) to c(m) since it knows the original secret value e and the nonce. In other words, if the verifier receives m data guards values c'(l) ... c'(m) from the attester node, any mismatch between c'(k) and c(k) is detectable for any k. In addition, if the attacker only sends 8 (8 < m) uncor rupted data guard values, the verifier can easily detect that there are some missing values. This is because C(8) has to equal to Ls, which has already been erased from the mem ory. Thus, we can see that the attacker cannot cheat about m. Note that sending all data guard values to the verifier is expensive. We will discuss how to reduce the cost later.
To make it more clear, let us revisit the example given in Figure 1 the data guard memory using the method described in the following subsection.
Data Guards Management

Attestation Protocol
Now we describe our attestation protocol, and discuss how it manages the data guard list and how the verifier checks the integrity evidence. We assume that all communi cations are protected by a pairwise key shared between the verifier and the attester.
• Initialize: During the initialization, the attester C sends a request to the verifier for initial secret e and nonce when it needs to set the first data guard value. Upon receiving the request, the verifier sends e and nonce to attester C. Given e and nonce, C uses Algo rithm 1 to set data guard values at runtime, and manage data guards as in Section 3.4.
• Attestation: During attestation, the verifier challenges C to send back integrity evidence. Once challenged, C retrieves all data guard values (both alive and re served) together and calculate a hash val ue on these data guards. This hash value, together with the se quence number m maintained at the attester, will be sent back to the verifier as the integrity evidence.
Given m, the verifier is able to compute all data guards since it knows e and nonce. As a result, it can com pare the hash value received from the attester with the hash value computed locally. If they do not match, the attester's system integrity has been compromised. ues for all alive data guards using Algorithm 1.
One additional benefit of our attestation protocol is that it effectively mitigates the TOUTOA problem. Once a data guard is corrupted, the attacker can never recover its state to pass the attestation. However, we have to point out that it is possible that a sensor node passed the attestation at time h but is later compromised and used as a legitimate sensor node at time t2 before the next attestation. However, this problem can be addressed in the following way. Assume that we need to verify whether a given sensor node has been exploited before time t. With our approach, we only need to attest the system at t. If this sensor node gives a cor rect answer, we know that nobody has overflowed its data yet. Thus, anything produced by this sensor node before t can be trusted. Thus, in the previous example, we can sim ply attest the sensor node again at time t2 to see whether this node should be trusted for anything produced before t2.
The benefit mentioned above cannot be achieved by existing attestation approaches. Our data boundary attestation scheme re quires the confidentiality of e. To steal e, an adversary has to compromise the victim before it is deleted. This is, however, very challenging for the attacker. In addition, our idea to achieve the first security requirement ensures that the adversary cannot overflow the data before the data guard is created. Our idea to achieve the second security requirement ensures that the adversary cannot recover any of the corrupted data guard values since they have been changed before he takes control of the victim and the infor mation needed to recover the corrupted data guard values are deleted right after they are created. Finally, our idea to achieve the third security requirement ensures that the at tacker cannot forge a correct answer without a complete set of correct data guards. In summary, we can conclude that our approach can detect any software attack that starts from overflowing program data objects.
Implementation
We use a sample C program in Figure 2 to show how our attestation scheme works. For nesC programs, we note that they are transformed to C programs by nesC compiler. As a result, we can directly apply the tool on the C program produced by the nesC compiler.
Program Transformation
We transform a program and instrument attestation se mantics into it. For example, the program P in Figure 2 is transformed into a new version in Figure 3 . We use JavaCC to build the abstract syntax tree (AST) and symbol table of P. Then we visit the AST nodes and take actions accord ingly. For a data declaration, we instrument data guard dec larations around it. For function entry, we instrument nec essary data guard initialization statements (atLaddguard).
For function return, we instrument data guard reservation statements (atLreserveguard). For certain memory ma nipulation function calls, we transform them to our wrap per functions. For example, for malloe, we wrap it to atLmalloe that allocates n bytes more memory than re quired, where n is the size of a data guard. Inside this wrap per function, the new data guard is created and added to the data guard list. For free, we wrap it to att_free, in which we backup the data guard value into the data guard list be fore freeing the memory.
The struct type data object must be handled properly since it contains data guards inside. First, data guards in side a struct object must be initialized and reserved care
fully. At the function entry point, we check if the function contains local struct type data (for main function, we also check global data). If it does, we look up the symbol ta ble to find the data guards inside this struct and instrument initialization code for them. For example, the main func tion in Figure 3 has Figure 3 , the variable p in function foo is a struct pointer. Thus, we add initialization code for p ---) guardl and p ---) guard2 right after malloe. If the free function involves a struct pointer, we instrument data guard reservation code before free as the reservation code for p ---) guardl and p ---) guard2 in the faa function in Figure 3 . Some library functions may manipulate a struct object directly. For example, the memset and memepy func-tions may be used to set or copy the content of a struct.
In this case, the data guards inside the struct are changed or copied to other place. It can either cause false positives or exploited by attackers to restore the corrupted data guard.
Therefore, if a struct object is involved in a memset func tion, we instrument code before memset to store its data guard values, and after memset to restore their values. If a memcpy involves struct objects, we instrument code right after memcpy to assign new data guard values inside the destination struct object.
Evaluation
We have discussed that a wide range of attacks can be captured by the data boundary integrity model in Section 3.
We have also crafted sample vulnerable programs and veri fied its effectiveness on Te losB [12] sensor nodes. The main purpose of the following experiment is to evaluate the effi ciency of the scheme on resource restricted sensor nodes.
We have implemented our scheme using TinyOS [11] and did experiments on Te losB sensor nodes. We use SHAI as the hash function, and take the most significant 32 bits of the result as data guard values. Note that this is reason able since the possibility that two data guards have the same value is still extremely small. Also, we did not instrument attestation semantics to library functions.
Memory Overhead
Our scheme introduces both static and dynamic memory overhead. For static memory, it introduces an additional at testation module for a sensor node which occupies around lK memory in our implementation. The SHAI module oc cupies 2K memory. The instrumented attestation code to a program also increases the code size. In our experiment, we measure the executable size for applications that have different number of data guards, and the result is shown in 
Computation Overhead
The main computation cost of our scheme is the runtime data guard value measurement. On average, we need one read, two writes, and two hash calculation to assign a new value to a data guard. Before returning from a function, we also need to reserve its local data guard values. When the data guard list becomes full, we also need to rearrange it, i.e., reassign values to alive data guards.
The frequency of calculating new data guard values de pends on the program structure and runtime program behav ior, i.e., the execution path. Suppose an execution path has m user-defined function calls, and each function has n data guards on average. Then there are m * n data guards need to be created at runtime. Also, there are m * n data guards need to be reserved in this process.
We did our experiment on all combinations of m and n where m is in set {I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20} and n is in set {I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 1O}. The data guard list has a length of 30, and the experimental result is shown in Figure 4 . As we can see, the time used to measure data guard values is almost linear to the number of data guards. It takes around 0.01 seconds to add a new data guard to the list, calculate its value, and save it to the list.
In real applications, we can further improve the compu tation cost. For example, we can use faster hash function or add data guards only to buffers instead of all progra� data. In addition, remember that our scheme introduces small communication cost as discussed in Section 3. There fore, our attestation scheme is practical for sensor networks. [16, 17] are also proposed for runtime checking. However, it is not clear whether they can be applied to resource lim ited sensor systems.
The data guard method is similar to StackGuard [4] that uses a canary word to protect the return addresses in stack.
However, our view point is more generic than theirs. With StackGuard, overflowing a buffer to manipulate the return address will corrupt the canary word placed before the re turn address. The canary word can be checked when the function returns. StackGuard cannot be directly applied to guard other program data. In addition, once the attacker compromised the system, StackGuard provides no protec tion, and no one would know what happened in the system.
In our approach, we intend to protect all program data ob jects even if the attacker compromises the system. We offer a way to tell whether a sensor system can be trusted.
Limitations
Note that our method can not detect attacks that do not corrupt data guard values. One important type of such at tacks isformat string where an external data can be used as aformat in print! family functions. Thus an attacker can read or write any memory content directly but not neces sary to corrupt any boundary data guard. However, in sen sor network, the necessary of using print! family functions is arguably rare. Moreover, format string vulnerability is relatively easy to detect by audit, static analysis method, or safer library [3] . Thus, they can be fixed before sensor node deployment. DataGuard also does not detect program er rors such as null or wild pointer deference as long as the data boundary is not corrupted.
Our implementation also introduces some limitations.
First, it requires that struct fields must be accessed through name instead of pointer and offset since additional data 978-1-4244-7501-8/101$26.00 ©2010 IEEE guards are added to a structure. This can be addressed by using more powerful analysis method. For example, we can translate the offset of a struct field to correct values consid ering the size of data guards. Second, it does not support fine-grained data protection, such as protect array element individually. However, we notice that such protection is of ten not necessary. Third, for maUoc data, our method is not precise since we treat the allocated memory block as a single object.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose dynamic data attestation in wireless sensor networks based on data boundary integrity.
We present how to set up, measure, and manage the data guards. We developed a prototype system and did experi ments on TelosB motes. The experimental result indicates that our scheme is feasible and effective in practice. In the future, we plan to improve our implementation and investi gate the integration of other techniques to address our limi tations.
